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Abstract: Cellular networks represent a critical infrastructure and their security is thus crucial. 5G 
– the latest generation of cellular networks – combines different technologies to increase capacity, 
reduce latency, and save energy. Due to its complexity and scale, however, ensuring its security 
is extremely challenging. In this white paper, we outline recent approaches supporting systematic 
analyses of 4G LTE and 5G protocols and their related defenses and introduce an initial security 
and privacy roadmap, covering different research challenges, including formal and comprehensive 
analyses of cellular protocols as defined by the standardization groups, verification of the software 
implementing the protocols, the design of robust defenses, and application and device security. 
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1734706. Any opinions, findings, 
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the National Science Foundation.
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1. Introduction
The Fourth Generation Long Term Evolution (4G LTE) technology has increased the bandwidth available for smartphones, in 
essence, delivering broadband capacity to smartphones. The most recent 5G technology is further enhancing the transmission 
capacity and reducing latency through the use of different technologies. It is expected to provide Internet connections that 
are at least 40 times faster than 4G LTE.  
Cellular networks are undoubtedly one of the most critical infrastructures. The novel 5G cellular networks [21] will connect 
IoT devices and systems, and thus promises to contribute to the transformation of cities, homes, healthcare imaging and 
diagnostics, manufacturing, transportation, and robotics.  
However, because 5G promises to make cellular networks pervasive and able to be used in any application we may think of, 
ensuring the security of 5G cellular network is highly critical [20]. For example, a denial of service (DoS) attack carried out on a 
5G cellular network may paralyze entire communities and service infrastructures with disastrous consequences.
Securing 5G cellular networks is a challenging and involved task. The 5G network protocol stack consists of multiple layers, e.g., 
physical layer, radio resource control (RRC) layer, non-access stratum (NAS) layer, etc. Each layer in turn has its own protocols 
to implement its procedures, such as the protocols for connecting/disconnecting devices to/from the network and for paging 
devices to deliver notifications of incoming calls and SMS. In addition, vulnerabilities can be introduced in the implementation of 
those protocols as the protocols are complex and the standards include many different options and leave some requirements 
abstract and implementation dependent. Additional requirements, such as backward compatibility, add to this complexity. It is 
important to point out that even though 5G is similar to 4G in all those respects, 5G will have additional challenges due to the 
many novel technologies that are (or will be) incorporated into it (see Section 2), which in turn will require adding new protocols 
and/or changing existing ones. Many such technologies have not yet been analyzed with respect to security. 
Further away from previous generations, 5G network has introduced major changes in the protocol stack and system 
architectures. For instance, 5G physical layer supports mobile broadband, massive machine type communication, and ultra-
reliable and low latency communication for a wide array of devices and applications. It also supports the public-key encryption 
in the non-access stratum (NAS) layer, concurrent multiple-registrations for connection through heterogeneous radio access 
technologies (e.g., 5G RAN and WLAN), different types of handover to support mobility, and service-based architecture at the 
core network that is required to incorporate new technologies and security mechanisms in the protocol, such as network 
slicing, programmable networking, and protections against unauthenticated access to network slices. As a result, along with 
the vulnerabilities in the inherited functionalities from 3G/4G networks, the new technologies and protocols added in 5G 
networks introduce new attack surfaces that have not yet been analyzed with respect to security and user privacy. So even 
though 5G has introduced security improvements over 4G, new vulnerabilities are likely to have been introduced because of 
the major extensions that 5G has introduced over 4G. 
Comprehensive analysis of such complex networks is challenging because of the complexity of the protocols, e.g., there 
are multiple participants and many intertwined sub-protocols across multiple protocol layers where each layer has its own 
protocols. In addition, reasoning about cryptographic constructs adds more complexity to the analysis.  
Research in the past few years has succeeded in identifying vulnerabilities that not only jeopardize the security of the 
ecosystem but also impact user privacy. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg and we are far from having systematic 
and comprehensive approaches to identify such vulnerabilities. In some cases prior work has relied on the analysis of 
network traces, in other cases on the use of cryptographic protocol verifiers, and in many other cases on researchers’ 
intuition. As a result, prior analyses are limited in scope and effectiveness. Devising suitable defenses against identified 
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vulnerabilities is equally critical. However, deploying and/
or extending available security techniques for wide-spread 
use in cellular networks is also challenging due to the 
complexity of the cellular network ecosystems and the 
incentives of the different stakeholders.  
The goal of this white paper is to propose an initial 
research roadmap, which can be augmented by 
interested parties, in order to open discussions around 
the security and privacy of 5G technology.  
2. 5G Technology  
5G cellular networks are based on a number of different 
technologies, which we review below: 
◗  Millimeter waves: These are electromagnetic waves 
that lie in the frequency range of 30-300 GHz in 
contrast to the band below 6GHz used for 4G LTE [1]. 
The microwave band is just below the millimeter-
wave band and is typically defined to cover the 3–30 
GHz range. Millimeter waves allow 5G networks to 
transmit very large amounts of data but only at short 
distances, and to also use unlicensed frequencies, 
currently used by Wi-Fi, without creating conflicts 
with Wi-Fi networks through the use of small cells to 
complement conventional cellular networks. 
◗  Small cells: These cells are portable base stations 
that complement conventional macro cells by 
providing extended coverage and increasing network 
capacities on demand. In addition, due to the reduced 
transmitter-receiver distance, small cells enhance 
energy efficiency [2]. Their intended use is mainly 
for dense areas, such as stadiums, and indoors. 
As a result 5G networks will rely on a multifaceted 
infrastructure consisting of macro and small ultra-
dense cells. The fact that small cells are portable will 
enable dynamic infrastructure. 
◗  Massive MIMO: Massive multiple-input, multiple-
output, or massive MIMO, is an extension of MIMO, 
which groups together antennas at the transmitter 
and receiver on a larger scale to provide better 
throughput and spectrum efficiency. An example of a 
massive MIMO is represented by 128-antenna array in 
a 64-transmit/64-receive configuration. As discussed 
in [3], massive MIMO can enhance spectral efficiency 
in two respects: (a) by allowing a base station (BS) to 
communicate with multiple devices on the same time-
frequency-space resources, and (b) by allowing multiple 
data streams between the BS and each device.  
◗  Beamforming: It can be defined as a technology 
that focuses a wireless signal towards a specific 
receiving device rather than spreading the signal 
in all directions. That is, it is a procedure steering 
the majority of signals generated from an array of 
transmitting antennas to an intended angular direction 
[3]. The use of beamforming allows one to deliver 
high quality signals to the receiver, thus reducing the 
transfer latency time and the number of errors.  
◗  Full duplex: Today BSs and mobile devices rely on 
transceivers that must take turns when transmitting 
and receiving information over the same frequency, 
or operate on different frequencies if a device wishes 
to transmit and receive information at the same time 
[4]. With full-duplex technology, a device will be able 
to transmit and receive data at the same time and on 
the same frequency. Such technologies can double the 
capacity of wireless networks. 
◗  Software defined networks (SDN): SDNs were 
introduced to enhance the flexibility of networks by 
separating network control and forwarding planes 
and making the control plane and data directly 
programmable. 5G SDN in combination with network 
functions virtualization technologies will support the 
creation of multiple hierarchies that compose the 
network topology, thus making 5G cellular networks 
able to meet different application requirements. 
3The brief descriptions above clearly show how the 
combination of several technologies can greatly increase 
communication capacity, reduce transmission latency, 
and save energy. However, it also clearly shows 
the complex and decentralized nature of 5G cellular 
networks, which expands cyber risks.  
3. Approaches to the security and 
privacy analysis of 5G protocols 
Having a robust 5G ecosystem will require designing 
protocols (e.g., connecting/disconnecting to/from 
the network) that are able to achieve their promised 
security and privacy guarantees even in the presence 
of adversarial influence. It is thus crucial to analyze 
designed protocols rigorously against their security 
and privacy guarantees in the context of an adversarial 
environment. This is particularly crucial since 
vulnerabilities in the design are likely to trickle down 
to implementations/deployments. Analyzing the design-
specifications/standards is full of challenges, such as 
having to reason about stateful protocols that leverage 
cryptographic constructs. In addition, these complex 
cellular network protocols can also interact with each 
other in unanticipated ways lending to the complexity of 
rigorous and formal protocol analyses. To address such 
needs, Hussain et al. have developed the first model-
based adversarial testing frameworks, LTEInspector 
[5] and 5GReasoner [6], for systematically analyzing 4G 
LTE and 5G cellular protocol standards in the context of 
security and user privacy.  
To address the challenge of reasoning about stateful 
protocols that employ cryptographic constructs, 
LTEInspector [5] combines the reasoning power of 
a symbolic model checker (for reasoning on trace 
properties and temporal ordering of different events/
actions) and a cryptographic protocol verifier (for 
reasoning on cryptographic constructs, e.g., encryption, 
integrity protections) in the symbolic attacker model 
using the counter-example guided abstract refinement 
(CEGAR) principle. In this approach, all cryptography-
related details are first abstracted away from the 
abstract model of the LTE protocol and the desired 
property to be tested against. The model is then 
automatically instrumented to include a relaxed Dolev-Yao 
style adversary who can drop, inject, or sniff messages 
in the public communication channels without having to 
adhere to cryptographic assumptions. Model checking is 
then used to verify whether the property in question holds 
against the abstract and adversary-instrumented model. 
If a counter-example demonstrating the property violation 
is found by the model checker, then a cryptographic 
protocol verifier is invoked to check whether the counter-
example can be realized by an attacker without violating 
the cryptographic assumptions. This additional refinement 
step of consulting with a cryptographic protocol verifier 
is warranted, as the produced counterexample could be a 
spurious one due to the abstraction of the model. Through 
its analysis, LTEInspector was able to uncover 10 new 
attacks in the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer procedures 
of 4G LTE network. This approach of lazily combining 
the reasoning power of a symbolic model checker and a 
cryptographic protocol verifier not only enables analysis 
of cellular protocols but can also be broadly applicable to 
analyze other real-world complex protocols. 
Since the instantiation of LTEInspector framework 
considers only a single layer (i.e., NAS) of the protocol 
stack and also does not model packet payload, 
LTEInspector may miss out on interesting cross-
layer and payload-dependent protocol behaviors. To 
address these limitations, Hussain et al. designed the 
5GReasoner [6] framework with a different protocol 
modeling discipline for 5G networks. Since faithfully 
capturing all packet payloads impedes the scalability 
of the analysis, 5GReasoner captures only those 
packet payloads that impact the security- and privacy-
specific behavior of the NAS and RRC (Radio Resource 
Control) layer protocols. To address the state-explosion 
problem of the model checking step due to payloads, 
the framework employs behavior-specific predicate 
abstractions. With 5GReasoner, Hussain et al. [6] 
identified eleven new exploitable protocol design 
weaknesses/flaws.  
The initial direction set by the LTEInspector framework 
also has been followed by other efforts using formal 
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modeling techniques for the analysis of 5G, including the 
theoretical analysis of the authenticated key exchange 
protocols used in 5G [7] that use a cryptographic verifier 
and a fuzzing-based approach to identify design and 
implementation vulnerabilities in 5G source code by 
carriers and device vendors [10]. 
4. Defenses 
While systematic analysis helps in identifying the root 
causes of vulnerabilities, it is also paramount to design 
efficient mitigation techniques and secure solutions to 
protect the next-generation cellular networks against 
advanced threats.  
Defense against fake base stations: A cellular 
device’s connection to the operator’s network starts 
off with the device initiating a connection to the base 
station that emits signals with the highest strength. 
Unfortunately, no mechanism currently exists by which 
a device can verify the legitimacy of a base station in 
the first place (see also discussion in [15]). This lack of 
authentication allows adversaries to install rogue base 
stations, which lure unsuspecting devices to connect to 
them. Forcing devices to connect to a fake base station 
is often the necessary first step for the adversary to 
carry out other destructive attacks, such as man-in-
the-middle, location tracking, SMS phishing, relay, and 
denial-of-service attacks. A notable exploitation of this 
weakness is performed by typical IMSI catchers, which, 
after luring the victim device, obtains the victim’s 
permanent identifier IMSI through a benign protocol 
interaction. Although this fundamental connection 
bootstrapping weakness is widely acknowledged, there 
does not seem to be a conscious effort in mitigating 
this even in the 5G standard that only strives to protect 
illegitimate exposures of a device’s permanent identifier 
using public-key encryption.  
To address this problem of insecure connection 
bootstrapping, Hussain et al. designed a Public-Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) based authentication mechanism 
[9] that leverages precomputation based offline-online 
digital signature generation algorithms to authenticate 
the initial broadcast messages emitted by a base 
station. Offline-online algorithms [18, 19] allow one to 
split a message to be signed in different portions and 
pre-compute the signatures of some portions off-line 
(typically of the portions that are fixed). The signatures 
of the other portions are computed on-line and then the 
signatures of all portions are aggregated. The proposed 
authentication mechanism also employs several 
optimization schemes to address the requirements of 
small signature size, efficient signature generation, and 
short verification time. One of the desired properties 
of this defense is that it can be deployed incrementally 
while maintaining backward compatibility.  
Defense against fake emergency alerts: After the 
establishment of a secure connection and session keys 
with the core network and base station, and when a 
device moves into the battery-conserving idle state after 
pre-defined interval of inactivity, the core network and 
base station work in harmony to deliver notification 
of service (e.g., SMS) to the device using the broadcast 
paging message. Along with incoming services (e.g., 
phone call), this unprotected message in both 4G 
LTE and 5G is also broadcast for sending emergency 
alerts to the device (e.g., Tsunami, Earthquake, and 
Amber). Taking this into consideration, Singla et al. have 
designed PTESLA, a symmetric-key based broadcast 
authentication mechanism [10] specifically tailored 
for 4G and 5G networks to protect the devices from 
unauthorized/fake paging messages. 
Defense against identity exposure attacks: To 
prevent illegitimate exposures of permanent identifier 
(e.g., International Mobile Subscriber Identity or IMSI 
in 4G, and Subscription Permanent Identifier or SUPI 
in 5G, respectively) of cellular subscribers, the 3GPP 
standard [12] for 5G specifications requires a cellular 
device to encrypt its IMSI/SUPI using the public-
key of the core network. Khan et al. [16], however, 
pointed out that the current 3GPP proposal of IMSI/
SUPI protection mechanism still exposes the network 
operator information of a cellular subscriber and thus 
cannot meet the strict privacy requirements. To address 
5this limitation, Khan et al. [16] has proposed a 5G-SUPI 
protection scheme based on Identity based Encryption 
(IBE), which induces significant protocol overhead.   
Defense against side-channel attacks: Hussain et 
al. [8] and Singla et al. [10] have also developed two 
countermeasures against ToRPEDO style side-channel 
attacks that exploit the fixed/static paging occasion in 
4G and 5G networks [8]. While the solution proposed 
by Hussain et al. [8], is geared towards backward 
compatibility and carefully injects and blends noises 
with the actual paging messages, the solution designed 
by Singla et al. [10] prescribes variable paging occasion 
based on the temporary identifier (TMSI). 
5. Research Roadmap  
Even though previous and on-going research efforts 
represent a good initial step towards security solutions 
for 5G cellular networks much more work is needed. In 
what follows, we articulate an initial research roadmap 
identifying several research directions.  
◗  Formal Analysis of Standards: Because of the 
complexity of 5G networks, research activities 
focusing on formal methods for analyzing the 5G 
standards encompass different research tasks: 
•  Radio Protocol Stack: While the systematic 
analysis frameworks developed by Hussain et al. 
[6] have been successful at identifying design 
weakness/flaws of the NAS and RRC layer protocols 
of 4G and 5G cellular networks, violations of 
security and privacy guarantees in other layers of 
the protocol stack, e.g., PDCP, RLC, MAC, and PHY 
(as shown in Figure 1) may lead to attacks and 
malicious activities, including impersonation attack, 
website redirection, DDoS, and radio frequency 
fingerprinting and jamming attacks. It is, therefore, 
crucial to incorporate such rigorous security 
and privacy analysis to all layers of 5G protocol, 
including radio access and core network, and the 
services that hinge on these critical networks.  
•  Inter-networking Protocols: The inter-networking 
protocols (e.g., SS7 and Diameter) for connecting 
multiple network operators have also historically 
been vulnerable to many different attacks. It is 
therefore important to analyze these existing 
inter-networking protocols, identify the trust 
assumptions across different network operators, 
and formally and rigorously evaluate them. 
•  Network Slicing: Network slicing, a key feature 
in 5G networks, will enable several new services, 
which will potentially expose new classes of 
security and privacy threats. The reason is that 
Figure 1. Cellular Network Architecture 
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5G requires each slice to be independent, self-
contained, dynamic, and adaptive in order to 
satisfy the varying needs of the different services. 
Therefore, it is important to evaluate whether 
the security and privacy posture meet the trust 
assumptions and security requirements between 
tenants and providers.  
◗  Verification of Software and Firmware: 
Implementations often deviate from the design 
because of specification ambiguities, missing 
security and privacy requirements, unsafe practices, 
and oversights stemming from inadequate input 
sanitization and simplification/optimization of complex 
protocol interactions [11]. Therefore, it is pivotal 
to holistically verify whether 5G protocol/system 
implementations faithfully adhere to the design 
specifications along with the security and privacy 
requirements. Also, the various technologies and 
devices that collectively comprise 5G technology (see 
Section 2) need to be closely analyzed for security. 
Depending on the specific technology and devices, 
firmware may have to be analyzed for security. 
◗  Root Cause Analysis, and Defense Development 
for Next Generation Cellular Networks: 
Understanding the root cause is important in order 
to partition protocol-level attacks (including identity 
exposure, location tracking, denial-of-service, and 
impersonation attacks) into classes of attacks where 
attacks in a particular class exploit the same protocol 
vulnerability. Once such an attack class is identified, 
one should develop defenses that will thwart that 
class of attacks by eliminating the underlying 
protocol vulnerability. To ensure the effectiveness 
of the attack, one can again analyze the protocol 
using similar frameworks, such as LTEInspector and 
5GReasoner, with the developed defense in place. 
Note that, band-aid-like defenses, in many cases 
designed in order to maintain backward compatibility, 
often do not hold up under detailed scrutiny. For 
instance, the paging procedure in a 5G network 
is significantly similar to that of 4G with a minor 
change in the paging occasion computation, which 
is now based on the temporary identifier instead 
of IMSI. However, the recent work on 5G formal 
verification of NAS and RRC layers has uncovered 
new vulnerabilities that allow the adversary to break 
the unlinkability of temporary identifiers and the 
privacy of paging occasion of a device and thus let 
the adversary track the user in a target area. Hence, 
it is pivotal to come up with clean-slate design of 
important sub-protocols, which may be adopted in 
future generations of cellular networks.  
◗  Application and Device Security: Unwanted phone 
calls, including spam and spoofed robocalls [13] have 
been a major concern for the last few years. Along 
with that, many cellular subscribers have recently 
been hit by the SIM-swapping/hijacking attack [14], 
which enables the adversary to take over the victim’s 
phone number to cause damage to victim’s finances 
and credit score. It is crucial to first understand the 
root cause of these attacks and then build verified 
defenses. To prevent robocalls we need to ensure the 
integrity of caller identity, whereas to prevent SIM-
swapping/hijacking attacks the network operators 
should enforce two-factor authentication through SMS 
or phone calls. Overall, one holy-grail to achieve in this 
domain is the ability to prove end-to-end security and 
privacy of a given application—that is, composing the 
application-level security measures and the guarantees 
provided by the cellular network indeed entail the 
overall expected security guarantees of an application. 
Such an approach can be extremely helpful during 
application development in deciding what security 
mechanisms an application developer can employ to 
achieve the application’s expected security and privacy 
guarantees. This will particularly rule out vulnerabilities 
that stem from the developers’ unjustified trust 
assumptions about the cellular network.    
6. Concluding Remarks 
The 5G ecosystem is complex and involves a large 
number of parties with different interests and 
perspectives [20]. It is clear that identifying vulnerabilities 
and designing defenses cannot be achieved by academic 
7research alone. It requires the collaboration of industries 
from multiple sectors, including network providers, 
manufacturers of equipment, software and service 
companies [17], as well as governmental regulatory and 
standardization bodies. 
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